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Introduction
Greece was bailed out in May 2010 and February 2012 by the 'Troika', which comprises the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The bailout loans were conditioned on the implementation of austerity measures, structural reforms, and privatisation of government assets.
On the 29 th of December 2014, the Greek parliament failed to elect a new president, which led to snap elections. Opinion polls taken before the elections indicated that the anti-bailout party Syriza (which announced that it would not comply with the previously negotiated terms in the bailout agreement) held the lead. This rising political uncertainty caused the Troika to suspend all scheduled remaining financial aid to Greece, until the Greek government either accepted the previously negotiated conditional payment terms or, as an alternative, could reach a mutually accepted agreement on updated terms with its creditors.
This rift rekindled the liquidity crisis for the Greek government and the Greek financial system, resulting in plummeting stock prices at the Athens Stock Exchange.
Meanwhile, interest rates for loans to the Greek government in the private lending market spiked, making it, once again, inaccessible as an alternative funding source.
When Syriza won the election on January 25, 2015, the Eurogroup granted Greece a four-month technical extension of its bailout programme with the proviso that the payment terms attached to its last tranche must be renegotiated with the new government As mentioned earlier, stock markets, not only in Greece, but also in the rest of the euro area reacted to these Grexit-related news (see also Figure A2 in the Appendix).
Narrative evidence suggests that positive news, defined as comments suggesting a less likely Grexit, led to an increase in stock returns, whereas negative news, defined as comments suggesting a more likely Grexit, led to lower returns. The paper at hand aims at quantifying these effects on stock returns in Germany, Greece, and the euro area. We begin our analysis by extracting the 378 statements from the Thomson Reuters database and coding them as to whether they (i) indicate a lower likelihood of a Grexit, (ii) contain a neutral stance or no clear information on the likelihood of a Grexit, or (iii) provide a signal that a Grexit more likely. We then use an event study approach to analyse how these statements impact stock returns measured in 30-minute intervals. By employing intraday data, we make sure that we identify the effects of only political communications and that our results are not confounded by other events.
There is some related literature on the influence of political communications on bond yields, bond spreads, or stock returns during the recent euro area sovereign debt crisis, including Beetsma et al (2013) , Mohl and Sondermann (2013) , Smeets and Zimmermann (2013) , Kilponen et al (2015) , and Conrad and Zumbach (2016) . Ehrmann et al (2014) study the determinants of the volatility of the EUR-USD exchange rate during the crisis. However, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to analyse the impact of Grexit-related news on stock returns. 1 We show that positive statements indicating that a Grexit is less likely lead to higher returns, and negative statements lead to lower returns, with the effect of negative statements being stronger. We also show that the Greek stock index reacts much more strongly to Grexit-related news than the German or the euro area index. The cumulative absolute effects on stock returns are sizeable as the statements contribute to a variation of up to 58 percentage points in the ATHEX. These large effects are of particular relevance as our study only captures an eight month snapshot of the Greek government debt crisis. Finally, we find that the comments of Greek PM Alexis Tsipras have the strongest impact on returns, followed by those of German FM Wolfgang Schaeuble.
In Section 2, we explain our empirical methodology. Section 3 introduces the data set of Grexit-related statements made by euro area politicians. Section 4 presents the empirical results, with concluding comments offered in Section 5.
Empirical Methodology
The relationship between stock indexes and expected future cash flows is well-established and can be formalised as follows:
1 A more established branch of the literature focuses on the determinants and consequences of central bank communication. See Blinder et al (2008) for an extensive literature overview.
The (logarithmic) stock index log p t is influenced by expected future cash flows X t with a sensitivity parameter φ > 0 and a stochastic component µ t . Lagging Eq. (1) by one period and taking first differences yields:
Defining returns as r t ≡ log p t − log p t−1 and further simplification of Eq. (2) yields:
Any new information about expected future cash flows such as, for instance, changes in expected macroeconomic conditions may influence stock returns. Consequently, any update on the expected likelihood of Greece exiting the euro area should also affect stock returns.
In this paper, we consider a decrease in the likelihood of a Grexit as increasing expected future cash flows (i.e., ∆X t > 0) and an increase the likelihood of a Grexit as a deterioration (i.e., ∆X t < 0). We measure changes in the likelihood of a Grexit by positive and negative statements made by six important euro area politicians, and quantify the impact of this Grexit-related news on three stock indexes, the DAX 30 for Germany, the ATHEX 20 for Greece, and the EUROSTOXX 50 for the euro area. Our empirical analysis aims at testing the following three hypotheses.
H1: Positive Grexit-related statements increase stock returns, whereas negative statements decrease stock returns.
H2:
The effect of negative statements is greater than the effect of positive statements (when comparing the absolute values).
H3:
The cumulative effect of all statements is stronger for Greek returns than for German or euro area returns.
H1 directly follows from the discussion above. H2 results from a standard feature in the behavioural finance literature or, more broadly, from psychology (Baumeister et al, 2001) . H3 is based on the fact that the Greek economy and the Greek stock market would be immediately hit by a Grexit, whereas the German (euro area) economy would only indirectly suffer via negative spillover effects.
Empirically, we use 30-minute intervals of DAX, ATHEX, and EUROSTOXX returns to quantify the influence of political communication on stock indexes. By employing intraday data, we make sure that we identify the effects of only political communications and that our results are not confounded by other events (see also, Almeida et al, 1997) , as a systematic correlation of Grexit-related news and other events in such a narrow time window is very unlikely. In addition, we are able to disentangle the influence of multiple statements on a single trading day more precisely. The general specification is as follows:
The stock returns r t,t+30 are explained by a constant term α, lagged returns r t−30,t to test for the persistence of returns or momentum effects, and Grexit-related news C t+30 . those observations with non-zero entries for C t+30 ) is estimated using ordinary least squares.
As part of our robustness test, we employ the full time series of all three stock indexes and estimate an EGARCH(1,1) model (Nelson, 1991) for the 30-minute returns.
This approach corrects for the excess kurtosis, skewness, and time-varying volatility of the asset prices, ensures a positive conditional variance, and allows for the detection of asymmetric effects of positive and negative innovations in the conditional variance.
The mean equation is identical to Eq. (4). However, the residuals of the mean equation 
Eq. (4)−(6) are estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood.
Grexit-Related News
The time period considered in this paper begins right after the failed presidential elec- The R 2 values indicate that the regressors are able to explain 40% (DAX), 66%
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(ATHEX), and 41% (EUROSTOXX) of the variation in the 30-minute stock returns, respectively. In general, the results for the DAX and the EUROSTOXX are very similar, which is not surprising as 14 out of the 50 companies listed in the EUROSTOXX are also listed in the DAX and enter the former index with a weight of more than 30%. To conserve space and to avoid reiterations the following discussion focuses on the results for the ATHEX and the EUROSTOXX. Counting the number of significant coefficients, we detect some evidence supporting H2. The Greek stock market is only influenced by negative news. None of the positive statements by the six politicians significantly affect ATHEX returns. Statistical testing confirms that negative statements made by Tsipras (F(1,114) = 3.94**) and Schulz (F(1,114) = 3.69*) have a more pronounced impact than their positive statements. The picture for the euro area index is less distinct as it is affected by positive statements as well.
Finally, our results also support H3 as the absolute size of the reaction is larger for the ATHEX compared to the EUROSTOXX. Again, statistical testing confirms this finding for the negative news from Tsipras (t = −2.26**) and Schulz (t = −2.31**).
The coefficients in Table 2 can be misleading insofar as some types of statements occur more often than others. As a consequence, a fairly small coefficient might have a large cumulative influence on the observed behaviour of financial markets if the frequency of this event is relatively high, and vice versa. For instance, Schaeuble delivered more negative statements than Tsipras. However, the point estimates for negative statements by Tsipras are larger than for Schaeuble. Therefore, we compare the impact by taking into account the frequency of comments. Table 3 shows the cumulative impact on returns per statement category on each stock market. Notes: The figures are calculated by taking the significant estimates from Table 2 , which are then multiplied by the respective frequencies of news (see Table 1 ).
The cumulative absolute changes provide some confirmation of H2 and H3. For the ATHEX returns, the impact of negative news (−58 pp) is clearly stronger than for positive news (which is non-existent). The EUROSTOXX shows a moderately stronger impact of negative news (−19 pp for negative news and 14 pp for positive news).
Similarly, despite the lower frequency of Grexit-related statements applicable to the ATHEX, the absolute cumulative effects of news are stronger for the ATHEX (58 pp) than for the EUROSTOXX (33 pp). The total variation of the Greek index in our event study time windows is 182 pp, which indicates that the significant coefficients alone contribute to 32% of its variation. Tables 2 and 4 with these typically being a bit smaller in the EGARCH estimations compared to the OLS models. Second, due to the higher number of observations the standard errors are smaller in the EGARCH estimations, occasionally resulting in higher significance levels.
In general, the EGARCH estimations also support H1 and H3. Positive (negative) statements lead to an increase (decrease) in returns and the effects appear to be more pronounced for the ATHEX than for the EUROSTOXX. However, the more balanced distribution of significant coefficients on positive and negative statements mitigates the evidence in favour of the asymmetry hypothesis H2. Nevertheless, the point estimates for negative news are, on average, still larger than for positive ones. 6 We show that positive statements indicating that a Grexit is less likely lead to higher returns, and negative statements lead to lower returns, with the effect of negative statements being stronger. We also show that the Greek stock index reacts much more strongly to Grexit-related news than the German or the euro area index. The cumulative absolute effects on stock returns are sizeable as the statements contribute to a variation of up to 58 percentage points in the ATHEX. These large effects are of particu-lar relevance as our study only captures an eight month snapshot of the Greek government debt crisis. Finally, we find that the comments of Greek PM Alexis Tsipras have the strongest impact on returns, followed by those of German FM Wolfgang Schaeuble.
Our paper contributes to the literature that analyses the effects of political communication on financial markets. The substantial effects documented in our study indicate that financial agents incorporate Grexit-related statements quickly, making significant adjustments in their trading behaviour. One important implication of our results is that European politicians should avoid such lengthy negotiations in the future so that the financial markets will experience less turbulence. This is of particular relevance as the debate about whether or not Greece should be bailed out another time is still going on and, if so, subject to which conditions. In fact, on May 25, 2016, euro area finance ministers agreed, after negotiations that took several months, on debt relief for Greece, extending the repayment period and capping interest rates. Since this agreement becomes effective in 2018, it is likely that there will be further negotiations concerning the repayment conditions of Greek government debt, which is also likely to cause continuing turbulences in Greek financial markets, as well as the rest of the euro area. Coding: Grexit less likely, i.e., 'positive' news: P; neutral stance/no clear information on Grexit: 0; Grexit more likely, i.e., 'negative' news: N. 
